Politics
Pay to track: Nigerians fund police investigations despite billions on
Despite over $6.61 billion invested by successive Nigerian governments in sophisticated surveillance technologies designed to strengthen criminal investigations, this investigation by The ICIR found that victims of robbery, fraud and threats are routinely asked to finance police investigations in Kano and the Federal Capital Territory, often with little or no meaningful investigation into the alleged crimes.
When armed robbers snatched Tarisa Samuel’s mobile phone along Kings Garden, Nasarawa Local Government Area of Kano State, in 2025, it was shortly before midnight, and the 35-year-old believed the police could help her recover it. Yes, they could recover the device, she was told, but they handed her a bill.
Samuel first reported the robbery at the Gwagwarwa Police Division, where officers asked her to write a statement, provide the carton of the stolen phone and purchase a case file, after which she was referred to the Kano State Police Criminal Investigation Department (CID).
There, police officers instructed her to obtain a replacement SIM card and return with her National Identification Number (NIN) slip. After complying, Samuel said the investigating officer, a female, informed her that tracking the phone would cost ₦45,000.
“I even asked for an account number so I could transfer the money, but the officer said I should bring cash,” Samuel told The ICIR. “She said the money was for tracking.”
Convinced that paying was the only way to recover the device, Samuel handed over the cash, but she said nothing changed weeks later. “When I went back, they told me the phone had been switched off, and they couldn’t track it. After about two months of going back and forth, I became frustrated and gave up,” she said.
Her frustration did not end with the stolen phone. On another occasion, after reporting recurring violence in her neighbourhood to the same police division, Samuel said officers again demanded money before responding.
“The truth is you cannot get justice without making payments,” she said. “They will ask for money for fuel, transportation or one thing or another. You must drop something.”
Her experience mirrors a wider pattern. In the course of this investigation, multiple sources told The ICIR that officers routinely demanded unofficial payments before taking investigative action, including tracking stolen phones or locating suspects. This is despite the federal government’s long-standing provision of advanced tracking technology meant to serve citizens.
“They said tracking would not start until i paid”
Sometime in 2019, burglars broke into the home of Kano resident, Tabita Oluwashola Olufemi, and stole a mobile phone containing important work documents. On the advice of a police officer, Olufemi reported the burglary at the Sheka Police Division.
She had hoped that her action would trigger an investigation, but she was instead asked to pay N15,000. Desperate to recover the device, she handed the money.
“They told me they wouldn’t even start the tracking if I didn’t give them the money. And at that point, I didn’t even get to know whether it’s official or non-official; I just wanted to get the phone back due to the files that I have on the phone,” she said.
By the time the police tracked the phone, it had been sold to another person, and attempts to recover it from the new owner proved problematic. Olufemi said the new owner sued her and the police for harassment, and eventually, she lost interest in the case and moved on.
“It was wasting my time,” she said. “I just left the matter with the police and bought another phone,” she said.
For many Nigerians, police demands for ‘fuel money,’ ‘transport money,’ or cash to ‘facilitate tracking’ have become routine, so much so that complainants now see these unofficial payments as the price of getting police assistance. Yet The ICIR found no publicly stated fee for phone-tracking services, raising questions about why such payments persist despite the police’s access to advanced surveillance and investigative technology funded by the federal government.
Over several weeks, The ICIR went undercover across four police commands in Kano and the Federal Capital Territory, posing as a complainant seeking police assistance to investigate criminal threats. The ICIR also interviewed victims who had sought help to track stolen phones or identify suspects.
The investigation found a recurring pattern. Before investigations into phone tracking, complainants were frequently asked to make unofficial payments variously described as “tracking fees” or “mobilisation fees.” In many cases, officers requested cash, despite the Nigeria Police Force maintaining that tracking services are provided free of charge.
The investigation also found that in some of the police stations visited, officers appeared ready to initiate phone or suspect tracking based largely on a complainant’s account, without visible evidence of extensive preliminary investigation or court authorisation. In some cases, they openly discussed the cost of tracking and referred complainants to private individuals who could facilitate the process without explaining whether the request would undergo further supervisory review.
Yet, under Nigeria’s legal framework, law enforcement agencies may obtain communications and subscriber data for criminal investigations but access to telecommunications information and interception powers are generally subject to statutory safeguards, including judicial oversight in circumstances prescribed by law.
Billions invested in surveillance
In the last six years, the Nigerian government have invested heavily in expanding the police’s digital surveillance capacity.
The ICIR’s analysis of budget records showed that between 2020 and 2025, the Nigeria Police Force was allocated approximately ₦19 billion for intelligence equipment, communications-monitoring capabilities and upgrades to its strategic surveillance platforms, including COBWEB.
The spending increased steadily over the period. In 2020, the Nigeria Police Force budgeted ₦38 million for intelligence equipment and ₦257 million for upgrading its intelligence tracking and monitoring systems, including the renewal of the COBWEB Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) licence and related system enhancements.
Further allocations followed in 2021, with a budgetary allocation of N125 million for intelligence equipment andanother N153 million for ‘Expansion/Upgrade of Intelligence Tracking/Monitoring Systems Including COBWEB OEM Licensing Renewal and System Maintenance’
In 2022, ₦1.1 billion was budgeted for intelligence equipment supporting the Technical Intelligence Unit (TIU), Intelligence Response Team (IRT) and Interpol operations.
The allocation increased significantly in 2023. That year alone, the police budgeted ₦7.5 billion as a Special Intervention Fund for a Cyber Intelligence Tracking System (CITS), alongside another ₦4 billion for activating and upgrading the COBWEB strategic surveillance platform.
Additional allocations of about ₦2.9 billion were approved in both 2024 and 2025 for further upgrades under the Technical Intelligence Unit.
These investments demonstrate that the Nigeria Police possess sophisticated surveillance infrastructure capable of supporting criminal investigations without requiring complainants to bankroll routine operations. Yet The ICIR found that many victims still face demands for unofficial ‘tracking’ or ‘mobilisation’ fees before officers initiate investigations — exposing a troubling gap between the resources provided and the practices on the ground.
COBWEB, GSM/UMTS at the centre of police intelligence
The ICIR found that the above budget allocations led to major government contracts to expand the Nigeria Police Force’s digital surveillance capabilities, including COBWEB.
COBWEB is a digital intelligence and communications analysis system designed to help investigators collect, analyse and correlate data from multiple sources, including telephone records, subscriber information, device identifiers and other digital evidence, to support criminal investigations.
Although the Nigeria Police has never publicly disclosed the platform’s full technical capabilities, procurement records and statements by senior police officials indicate that it was developed to strengthen investigators’ ability to identify suspects, analyse communications and support phone-tracking operations.
According to records obtained from the Public Treasury Portal, the Nigeria Police Force paid ₦16.86 million (₦16,855,056) to Ontrac Technologies Limited in December 2021 for the acquisition of a COBWEB Data Analytical Server.
Two years later, in December 2023, the Force made another payment of ₦2.62 billion to the same company as part of the cost of the “Emergency Activation and Upgrade of the Strategic Surveillance System of Public Safety for NPF Technical Intelligence Unit (COBWEB),” for the Nigeria Police Force Technical Intelligence Unit’s COBWEB platform.
These payments were part of spending on the surveillance platform during a period when multi-billion-naira allocations were approved between 2023 and 2025.
Findings also showed that multiple Nigerian security institutions, including police and intelligence agencies, possess advanced communications-surveillance gadgets, including the GSM/UMTS interception system.
These systems are designed to interface with second- and third-generation (2G and 3G) mobile networks, allowing authorised operators to identify mobile devices and SIM cards, determine their approximate locations, monitor network activity and, where legally permitted, intercept voice calls, text messages and certain forms of mobile data traffic for investigative purposes.
A 2024 research by Accountability Lab Nigeria, a civic accountability organisation, revealed Nigeria spent approximately $2.7 billion on surveillance technologies between 2013 and 2022. This included the GSM/UMTS interception system.
The report, which quoted a 2023 study by the Institute of Development Studies and the African Digital Rights Network, titled Mapping the Supply of Surveillance Technologies to Africa, described Nigeria as Africa’s largest purchaser of surveillance technologies, estimating expenditure at approximately $12 per citizen.
The study found that Nigeria had acquired virtually every major category of surveillance technology examined by the researchers, including internet interception systems, mobile interception platforms, biometric databases, social media monitoring tools and public-space surveillance systems.
Data from United Nations Comtrade also shows that Nigeria imported surveillance equipment worth $6.61 billion between 2015 and 2024, with annual imports peaking at $826.8 million in 2019 before falling to $469.6 million in 2024.
Speaking to The ICIR, Favour Ebuanekpe, a certified cybersecurity analyst, software engineer and founder of BuzzT Cyber Academy, described COBWEB and Cyber Intelligence Tracking System (CITS) as intelligence tools primarily used by security agencies to identify suspects, locate devices and gather intelligence.
He said the systems integrate information from telecommunication networks and multiple databases to help investigators identify individuals and track mobile devices.
“COBWEB is actually a tracking or intelligence platform,” Ebuanekpe said. “CITS is mainly for cyber intelligence tracking capabilities. They all perform similar functions. When you’re tracking phones, you use the IMEI number, the Cell ID, and they definitely work with telecommunications. They can associate their surveillance with telecommunications identifiers. They can determine the location, call records and recent call logs of the individual.”
Explaining how GSM and UMTS interception systems operate, Ebuanekpe said they effectively build what he described as “a digital map” of a mobile device by combining several identifiers. “So if we are looking at how GSM and UMTS interception systems could technically identify, locate and analyse mobile devices, just think of the system as building a digital map of the phone,” he said.
He explained that the systems rely on four key elements: the individual, the SIM card, the physical device and network activity.
“GSM and UMTS interception systems primarily work with the cellular network, while intelligence platforms like COBWEB obtain information from multiple sources, correlate it and analyse it,” he said.
He added that the systems technically locate devices by relying on multiple identifiers rather than the phone number alone.
Following the surveillance supply chain
Ontrac Technologies Limited, an information and communications technology company providing systems integration, cybersecurity and telecommunications solutions to government and enterprise clients, was registered in Nigeria on December 23, 2008. The company has its registered office at 25 Colorado Close, Maitama, Abuja and is currently active on the Corporate Affairs Commission with Kenneth Emeka Nwabueze and Chukwudi Nwabueze listed as its directors and shareholders, while Mfonobong Eno is the company secretary.
When The ICIR visited the company’s registered address on Colorado Close, Maitama, Abuja, on July 14, the premises appeared to be a residential property rather than a corporate office. Security guards at the location told the reporter they were unaware of any company operating from the address and could not identify the building’s owner.
However, when contacted on July 29, the company’s secretary, Mfonobong Eno, confirmed that Ontrac Technologies had previously worked with the Nigeria Police. He said the company installed software applications for the force “some years” ago.
He, however, declined to provide further details about the project and denied that it was related to surveillance.
Similarly, trade records reviewed by The ICIR show that between May and July 2024, a United Kingdom-based surveillance technology company, Signum Intelligence Limited, shipped at least 63 consignments of surveillance-related equipment to Ontrac.
The shipments included antenna modules, electronic modules and interconnection cables commonly associated with communications intelligence systems.
Public records describe Signum Intelligence as a supplier of lawful interception and communications intelligence technologies for government clients. Its publicly available product portfolio includes systems capable of identifying mobile subscribers, locating devices and supporting communications interception where legally authorised.
The timing of those shipments also coincided with the implementation of the Nigeria Police Force’s multi-billion-naira COBWEB upgrade between 2020 and 2025.
While The ICIR could not independently establish that every shipment formed part of the COBWEB project, procurement timelines indicate that the deliveries occurred during the same period the surveillance platform was undergoing major expansion.
Undercover investigation confirms practice in Kano
Despite being located at the bustling Tarauni LGA of Kano State, the Farm Centre Police Command was unusually quiet when The ICIR visited one morning in June, 2026. The overcast sky seemed to mirror the calm inside the station, where only a handful of officers were gathered near the entrance. After passing through the open gate, this reporter approached the security post and introduced himself as a complainant seeking police assistance.
Using the case of a complainant who said she received repeated threatening phone calls and was told by police in Kogi State to pay money to track the suspect, The ICIR sought urgent police assistance at the Farm Centre Police Command in Kano.
During the visit, this reporter met an officer with no visible name tag behind the counter and explained the situation. The officer made it clear that the case would require payment for phone tracking and a possible mobilisation fee.
He then instructed the reporter to wait for an officer identified simply as Khalid, assuring him that “he will track him (suspect) for you.”
As soon as Khalid arrived, he explained that since the suspect’s whereabouts were unknown, the police would use a private tracker to determine the cost of tracking before the suspect could be arrested.
Officers made it clear that payment was expected before any investigation could move forward. Khalid later admitted he had contacted ‘the tracker guy’ but was still waiting to hear the exact cost of tracing the suspect, a delay that ultimately led The ICIR to withdraw from the process.
This reporter also met another officer in the same station, identified only as ‘Yellow’, who said the police would engage a private individual to track the phone and suspects. According to him, the individual would charge more than N25,000 for the service.
Further findings by The ICIR showed that officers, like Khalid and ‘Yellow,’ often forward complainants’ details to private individuals who carried out the tracking or referred the cases to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID).
For many complainants, however, the process ended in frustration. Victims said they spent thousands of naira responding to repeated demands for tracking and mobilisation fees, only to be met with delayed action or no arrest at all. Some abandoned their cases after they could no longer meet the officers’ financial demands, despite assurances that suspects had already been tracked.
Tracking ‘suspects’ through the CID
Meanwhile, the practice was not limited to private trackers. The ICIR found that even when officers refer complainants to the State Criminal Investigation Departments, demands for money are made before phones are tracked. On June 27, The ICIR walked into the Kumbotso Police Division in Kano state, where three officers sat under a small shelter outside the station.
One of them, Muhammad Rabe, listened to the complaint before leading the reporter to the counter. Unlike Farm Centre, the process moved quickly. Before taking any written statement, Rabe pulled out a button phone and called a colleague identified as Mujitaba, an officer, he said, attached to the Kano State Criminal Investigation Department at the state police headquarters in Bompai.
After a short conversation, Rabe ended the call, looked at the reporter and quietly said, “Follow me.” Instead of remaining in the public area where complaints were normally received, he led the way into the station, through inner corridors and into a room officers referred to as Babban Daki—literally, “the big room.” There, Rabe requested that the reporter “see him off,” a familiar Nigerian euphemism understood to mean a request for money before he would proceed with his case and link him up with Mujitaba. The reporter later parted with ₦1,000 and was linked to Mujitaba.
The following day, this reporter contacted Mujitaba and provided him with the telephone number of the person who had allegedly been threatening the complainant in Kogi State, along with the threatening voice notes that had been sent to her.
About 30 minutes after reviewing the information, the officer called back with what he described as his professional assessment. Tracking analysis, he said, would cost ₦30,000, and the money should be transferred into his personal Opay account. That amount, he explained, covered only the tracking process.
The officer, however, stressed that if the suspect is eventually located within Kano State, another payment would likely be required before officers could move in to arrest him.
Like Kano, Abuja police demand tracking, mobilisation fee
The pattern documented in Kano was not confined to the state. Interviews with victims in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), coupled with undercover findings by The ICIR, revealed similar demands for unofficial payments before officers would initiate phone tracking or arrest operations.
In November 2022, Habeeb (second name withheld) was fast asleep when he heard a loud bang in his room. Armed robbers forced themselves in and ransacked his room in Durumi, Abuja. At gunpoint, they took away Habeeb’s iPhone 12 Pro Max, Samsung A13, two laptops, power bank and his earpods.
The following morning, he reported the robbery at the Durumi Police Station.
“I was told to return later that day. About three hours later, I went back. They called someone they described as an expert in phone tracking. Although they asked me questions and made inquiries, I was told that before they could commence any work, I had to pay ₦10,000, which I did.”
According to him, the ‘phone-tracking specialist’ later informed him that one of the stolen phones had been traced to Nyanya, on the outskirts of Abuja. But recovering it, he said, came with another demand.
The officers allegedly told him they needed ₦50,000 to mobilise personnel and fuel their vehicle for the operation.
“After negotiations, the amount was reduced to ₦40,000, bringing the total amount I paid to ₦50,000. They said the operation would be carried out at midnight because the area was too dangerous to visit during the day,” he recalled.
As the night wore on, Habeeb said he received repeated phone calls and messages from the officers who claimed they were pursuing the suspects. “Eventually, I realised they were lying. They were just playing me,” he said.
Frustrated by the lack of progress, Habeeb escalated the matter to a senior officer attached to the Special Intelligence Unit. It was only after the intervention of the superior officer, who was not attached to the division where he lodged his complaint, that he recovered N40,000 from the money he paid.
Like Habeeb, multiple victims interviewed by The ICIR said their cases stalled after they were unable to meet officers’ demands for mobilisation fees, despite having already paid for phone tracking. Those who raised additional money said the promised operations either never took place or yielded no results, with officers offering repeated excuses until the complainants eventually gave up pursuing their cases.
For Quadri (first name withheld), a female investigative journalist with one of Nigeria’s leading investigative media organisations, reporting a case to the police became necessary after a suspect she had exposed in an investigation sent her a threatening WhatsApp message. The suspect, in a WhatsApp message, claimed to know where Quadri lived and warned that he would attack her if she did not take the story down.
Although she wasn’t one to be easily bullied, Quadri said she became worried when the suspect grew increasingly persistent, tracked down her Instagram page, and claimed to know where she lived. She subsequently reported the threats to her former newsroom.
The newsroom sent three staff members to visit the Pyakasa Police Division in the Federal Capital Territory on her behalf and formally lodge a complaint, hoping the police would investigate the threats.
At the station, an elderly police officer in a faded sky blue uniform, without a visible name tag, listened as the threats against Quadri were explained. The officer scribbled a few details on a sheet of paper before leading them outside to where the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) was seated.
There, the DPO confirmed that the complaint had been made, but the discussion quickly shifted to what would be required before the police could act.
“The DPO asked where the threat occurred. When we told him it was online and that we did not know where the individual was based, he said the person would have to be tracked, and we would facilitate the tracking,” One of the colleagues who reported Quadri’s case, and whose name has been withheld, said.
The ICIR observed a similar pattern during an undercover visit to the station. After reporting a stolen mobile phone, the undercover reporter was told to pay ₦80,000 to initiate the tracking process via a private agent. Although the reporter explained that he would return with the necessary details, officers also demanded ₦5,000.
The reporter, however, declined to make the payment, explaining that he intended to return to pursue the complaint.
Allegations extend beyond Kano, Abuja
The allegations documented by The ICIR are not limited to Kano and the Federal Capital Territory. Similar complaints were also recorded in other parts of the country, including Ogun State.
In a widely shared social media thread posted in June 2025, a resident of Ogun State explained how his mother allegedly lost more than ₦720,000 to fraudsters operating a fake website that impersonated the Ondo State School of Nursing.
The social media user alleged that after the family realised they had been defrauded, they reported the matter to their banks and later approached the Ogun State Police Command Headquarters at Eleweran, Abeokuta.
However, according to the post, the officers allegedly informed the family that they would need to pay ₦150,000 to obtain a court order, approximately ₦200,000 to track the suspects’ telephone numbers and another ₦200,000 to “fuel” police vehicles that would be used if officers eventually travelled to arrest the suspects.
After being told his mother would have to pay the money before the police could proceed with tracking and arresting the alleged fraudsters, he said his mother opted out from pursuing the police investigation.
Police violates its own law
Meanwhile, these experiences stand in contrast to the official position repeatedly presented by the Nigeria Police Force. The ICIR reports that Section 4 of the 2020 Police Act mandates the police to prevent and detect crimes, protect lives and property, preserve law and order, and enforce all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged.
These statutory duties include receiving complaints from members of the public and investigating criminal offences such as theft, robbery and fraud.
The Act does not make the investigation of crimes contingent on victims paying police officers or privately engaged trackers before official investigative steps are taken. Rather, it places the responsibility for preventing and detecting crimes squarely on the Nigeria Police Force as part of its statutory responsibilities.
The findings also contrast with the Force’s public position.
In December 2024, the former Force Public Relations Officer, Olumuyiwa Adejobi, responded to complaints from Nigerians who said they had paid police officers to track stolen phones.
Adejobi insisted that tracking lost items was free and said the Force Headquarters in Abuja operated a functional tracking office where such services were provided with no charge.
He, however, acknowledged that the office was often overwhelmed due to the volume of requests it received.
“The IGP renews the charges and subscriptions constantly every year. The IGP has been making constant payments of TIU charges and upgrading the equipment. So tell your IPO to send your details to the Abuja TIU office. It’s free. But you will need to be patient because of the workload since the office is grossly engaged in all our operations across the country,” he wrote.
Reacting to the findings of this investigation, Abuja-based lawyer and Managing Partner at Liberty Semper Fidelis LP, Abdul Mahmud, said the police have a statutory duty to prevent and detect crime and investigate offences, with such activities funded through public appropriations rather than payments from complainants.
“There is no provision authorising officers to demand ‘tracking fees,’ ‘mobilisation fees,’ or other unofficial payments from complainants before carrying out those duties,” Mahmud said.
He noted that any legitimate fee payable to the police must be expressly provided for by law and advised members of the public to request official government account details and receipts whenever payments are demanded.
Mahmud further said that where officers demand unofficial payments before performing their official duties, such conduct could amount to corruption, extortion, abuse of office or official misconduct under Nigerian law.
“The existence of government funding for surveillance and investigative tools strengthens the argument that such unofficial demands are unlawful,” he said.
Addressing The ICIR’s finding that some officers appeared willing to initiate phone tracking largely based on a complainant’s account, Mahmud stressed that the use of surveillance tools is regulated by law and cannot be exercised without due process.
According to him, the use of communications data and phone-tracking powers is governed by the Constitution, the Police Act 2020, the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015 (as amended), and the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023.
He explained that while law enforcement agencies may lawfully conduct surveillance in certain circumstances, intrusive measures such as the interception of communications ordinarily require judicial authorisation unless a specific statutory exception applies.
“A complainant’s allegation alone is not, by itself, sufficient legal authority to track a person’s phone without compliance with the applicable legal safeguards,” Mahmud said.
FCT police frown at extortion
Responding to The ICIR’s findings on Friday, July 24, the FCT Police Command, Josephine Adeh, said the command maintains a firm stance against “all forms of extortion.”
“If any complainant has such issues, they can report the particular officer to the Office of the Commissioner of Police for investigation and proper administrative action. My office is always open to address such complaints,” she said.
However, when The ICIR contacted the Kano State Police Command’s Public Relations Officer, Abdullahi Haruna, via WhatsApp on July 24, he asked that the reporter visit his office in Kano before he could comment on the allegations.
This was despite reminding him that an earlier attempt to reach him by telephone on June 24, when this reporter was in Kano, had been unsuccessful because his line was unreachable.
Subsequent follow-up via WhatsApp messages sent on July 27 and July 28, reminding him to provide the command’s official response, received no reply.
Surveillance investments outpace accountability- Accountability Lab
Reacting to the findings of this investigation, the Country Director of Accountability Lab Nigeria, Friday Odeh, said the country’s accountability mechanisms had failed to keep pace with the government’s growing investments in surveillance infrastructure.
According to him, although the government has committed billions of naira over the past decade to surveillance technologies, including lawful interception platforms, communications monitoring systems, forensic tools, COBWEB upgrades and cyber-intelligence infrastructure, citizens continue to report paying unofficial tracking and mobilisation fees before investigations are carried out.
“This suggests that Nigeria’s accountability framework has not kept pace with its surveillance investments,” Odeh said. “Investment is being measured by procurement rather than service delivery or investigative outcomes.”
He said the situation raises concerns about weak oversight of how surveillance systems are deployed, inadequate auditing of their operational use and the lack of consequences for abuse or extortion.
To address the gaps, Odeh called for stricter oversight of surveillance operations. He recommended that every surveillance request be backed by clear legal authorisation and supported by digital audit trails identifying who requested, approved and used the surveillance tool.
Mustapha Usman is an investigative journalist with the International Centre for Investigative Reporting. You can easily reach him via: musman@icirnigeria.com. He tweets @UsmanMustapha_M
