US Wants Better India Ties But Going About It The Wrong Way: Derek Grossman

Nayanima Basu: What is the likelihood of the US-India trade deal being signed given trade tariffs being declared illegal by US courts as well as the Section 301 investigations?

Derek Grossman: So you have the Supreme Court decision in February ruling against Trump’s reciprocal tariffs, for the most part, and then you also had the international trade court ruling against tariffs as well. And so now this has become a real problem for Trump and the administration because the linchpin of their strategy to create a more not just free trade situation, but a fair and reciprocal situation is to be able to levy tariffs into sanctioned countries through other means. And so now I think they’re looking for other ways to do that.

You know, we see these Section 301 investigations through the U.S. Trade representative coming to the fore now to include multiple countries in Asia. And so I think you’re going to see more of that over time. But in terms of the actual free trade agreement between India and the United States, I mean, it has not been finalized yet. There’s still waiting on some details. It’s unclear what exactly they’re looking at. But I think Trump wants that done as soon as possible. And he’s instructed Sergio Gor, the Ambassador of the United States to make that happen.

Q: Does the US actually want a trade deal with India?

A: President Trump is all about pomp and circumstance – You know, “Modi’s a good friend of mine. I want to meet with Modi, and show that we’re on the same page.” But at the end of the day, the Indian side, I think, is looking at concrete policy deliverables. And if there are none to speak of in this case, no free trade agreement signed, then that’s a problem. You know, why are we meeting with the U.S. side if we don’t have what we want in place? And for Trump, he does want a free trade agreement as well. It’s just a matter of hashing out details, but what we’ve seen with this administration is that they are big on ideas, but short on details.

Q: How will this constant threat of tariffs going to work? Now the Russia Sanctions Bill, which has been passed by the US Senate, will be heading for a floor vote at the House of Representatives, under which the U.S. can impose up to 100 per cent tariffs on India. 

A: It’s really a case of dysfunction in the system, because you have Trump wanting to do certain things to have a better relationship with India. I think, even though, yes, there was last summer and he wrecked the relationship, but that was for over personal reasons. I think overall he wants to have a better relationship with India, but the problem is that there’s too much going on in the world system in order to get there. You know, I mean, that the Iran war and the Russian-Ukraine conflict. And Lindsay Graham, before his passing, was big on trying to pass this sanctions bill.

And, I think with Graham passing, it really helped because it’s part of his legacy. So now you have the Senate officially passing the sanctions bill. Now it seems like it’s a pretty strong possibility that you’ll get the House to pass it as well, which will mean that India could be subjected to very high sanctions under that bill for importing Russian oil.

And that runs counter to what the U.S. is trying to achieve with India, which is a better relationship, based on mutual cooperation and respect. United States does want to have a better relationship with India. But we’re going about it in the wrong way. The fault is in the implementation, not necessarily in the goal.

Q: But Trump himself wants to maintain ties with Russia. And with China he sees a G-2 scenario. Where does this put India US relationship? 

A: When Trump meets with (Russian President) Vladimir Putin, I think that’s fine for India. But when he meets with (Chinese President) Xi Jinping, with all the pomp and circumstances, getting the red carpet rollout, the 21-guns salute, that makes it look like, yes, Trump has signed off on a G-2, and I’m sure that makes India uncomfortable. And rightfully so. But again, remember who Trump is. He wants to be fashioned as a king. He’s the imperial president that we didn’t want to have, and now we have. The founding fathers at least didn’t want an imperial presidency. And they designed our system to prevent that possibility.

But now we have that president. And what that means is Trump wants to have a relationship with Xi that is based on strongmen ruling the world together. That doesn’t mean the US-China competition has ended. It continues. But, it’s on the back-burner a bit… And I think you’re going to see it continue. When Xi comes to New York in September for the UNGA and then comes down to the White House to meet with Trump, the two leaders are probably going to meet at least two more times – at APEC as well as on the sidelines of ASEAN.

So, for the Chinese and American leaders to meet four times in one year, it’s probably a record. And that, I think, is a testament to the personality politics that Trump prioritizes in a relationship with China. I don’t think Xi prioritizes that. But Trump does, and Xi is playing into it because if it means having a better relationship with the United States, in other words, to be able to take advantage of the United States while they’re doing that, then it’s in Beijing’s interest to do so.

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Q: While all this is happening between the US and China, President Trump is not coming to India at all. And, that has put the Quad Summit in jeopardy. 

A: I think last year, Trump should have come to India for the Quad summit. He didn’t because of his personal gripes with Modi. But now I think I think it’s just that India’s time has passed on hosting the Quad because now it has shifted to Australia. So Trump can simply say, well, the next country up is Australia, and I don’t think he’s ruled out the possibility of going there sometime this year or maybe timing on the sidelines of ASEAN or something like that.

I think the real gripe Trump had last year was that Modi didn’t nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize and resolving the India-Pakistan War. And not to say he deserved to be nominated, but this is Trump we’re talking about, so everything is personal. And, you know, going back to what we were talking about earlier, not having the free trade agreement took place, was also problematic because Trump wanted to have something to come back to the United States with instead of just going to a country, meeting with them, saying we’re friends, and then having nothing to show in return.

Q: The dynamics in the Indo-Pacific has certainly changed as far as the U.S. is concerned. India is beginning to understand that and hence now it is creating its own alliances in the region.

A: I do think that things are changing and I do think there is a difference. The change from USINDOPACOM back to USPACOM, even though the area of responsibility has not changed, the conceptualization within the U.S. government and the U.S military in particular, has changed. And I say that because it’s not just the difference in the name, but also look at US Secretary (of Defense) Hegseth’s comments at the Shangri-La dialogue earlier this year. He didn’t mention Indo-Pacific at all. He mentioned Asia Pacific. Look at the Pentagon statement after the secretary met with his Chinese counterpart. They talked about power sharing within Asia. That’s new language. As far back as I can remember, the U.S. always talked about being the dominant power in Asia and across the world, not sharing power with anybody. And I think that is the byproduct of Trump informing all of his secretaries that we need to have a better relationship with China, because Trump himself wants to have a better relationship with a fellow strongman.

And that means that we’re going to see a more collaborative relationship with China. The one potential outlier is on AI. I think we may see a real agreement on that in September. But for the most part, any sort of collaboration, whether it’s on fentanyl or other issues like that, are basically going to entail China doing things that it’s already doing and we’re already planning to do. Nothing new on the Chinese side. Nothing new on the American side either. But to just kind of keep the momentum going, I can see both nations playing the role of engaging each other to make it seem like something’s happening when it’s not. And all of this is in the interest of tamping down the frictions that come with strategic competition.

Because you have Trump thinking one thing about the US-China relationship. I just want to have a good relationship with China. But then you have an entire bureaucracy under him that’s been consistent from his first administration that China’s not our friend. China, at best, is a strategic competitor, at worst, is a rival as an enemy. And I think that that has not gone away. And, it won’t in spite of what Trump may want.

Q: But India seems to have certainly fallen off the radar somewhat, for Trump. 

A: India is now sort of less important encountering or containing China on its western flank. The Indian Ocean region as a subregion of the Indo Pacific, which  includes Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives etc. – none of them are as important as they were in the first Trump administration or in the Biden administration. Now, the emphasis is really on ‘First Island Chain’ defence.

It’s always been there, but I think it’s now even more the case than it had been before. So what that means is that the prioritization is on Japan, on the Philippines, on South Korea, on Australia, and less so on India and the IOR (Indian Ocean Region). Because, that was kind of like a nice to have, not a necessity. To have India potentially cause problems for China in the West and make China split its time between West and East when it really wants to focus on East, we viewed that in the past as a strategic advantage that we would do anything to get. Now we’re looking at it as nice if it happens, but we’re not going to prioritize it. That is a big shift.

But I got to tell you that the first island chain defense prioritization also is in trouble because when we look at what we’re doing there, if we’re going to put all our eggs in one basket with Japan or the Philippines, China’s military has now improved its capabilities to the extent that everybody there is sitting ducks. We need to be able to fall back to the second or maybe even third island chain. And not just fall back, but be able to disperse our forces, harden our facilities, but maintain lethality at the same time.

Q: So what exactly is the strategy of the United States? 

A: What we are seeing is that the U.S. has decided to redeploy troops from Okinawa to Guam. But then, in Guam, we’re now centralizing forces there. In fact, we have a new Marine Corps base – the first Marine Corps Base to open since the end of World War II. Camp Blaz is now on Guam. So that’s three bases – Air, Navy, and Marine Corps bases, all in Guam. So why aren’t we dispersing troops and equipment and systems to other places outside of Guam? It’s a mistake, because now everybody is now a sitting duck in Okinawa, but a city duck in Guam.

The Trump administration has basically done nothing in the Pacific Islands region to try to shore up support for competition against China. And this is curious because in the first Trump administration, there was a lot of interaction with the Pacific Island countries because they recognized it. You have to do that to have a fallback plan in the first island chain.