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Ajit Doval is in Beijing as India-China ties face another test.
The immediate issue is the Line of Actual Control, where both sides are trying to consolidate the relative calm that followed the prolonged military confrontation in eastern Ladakh.
But the wider relationship is being tested by a more turbulent geopolitical and economic environment, from the conflict in West Asia and disruption around the Strait of Hormuz to volatile energy markets and supply-chain pressures.
According to the Ministry of External Affairs, Doval arrived in Beijing on Monday for a two-day visit at the invitation of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
The two are scheduled to hold the 25th round of Special Representatives’ talks on the India-China boundary question on August 25. Doval is also scheduled to call on Chinese Vice President Han Zheng.
The Chinese side has also confirmed the meeting, saying the two countries will “jointly keep border areas peaceful & tranquil”.
That makes the border the immediate test of the reset. But it is no longer the only one.
The Special Representatives mechanism, established in 2003, is the highest-level political channel between India and China for addressing the boundary dispute.
The 25th round follows the August 6 meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs in New Delhi, where the two sides discussed boundary delimitation, border management, institutional mechanisms and trans-border cooperation.

India’s position remains that normalisation cannot be separated from peace and tranquillity along the LAC. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has reiterated that position while reflecting on the deterioration in relations following the 2020 crisis.
For New Delhi, economic and diplomatic engagement can expand, but it cannot be built on an unstable frontier. That puts border management, military communication, de-escalation and progress on delimitation at the centre of the current effort.
Disengagement at individual friction points does not automatically mean that the larger military confrontation has disappeared.
The timing of Doval’s visit is also significant because it comes ahead of two possible leader-level engagements.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, from August 31 to September 1. A meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines would give the two leaders an opportunity to assess the direction of bilateral relations.
More consequential could be Xi’s expected visit to New Delhi for the BRICS summit on September 12-13. Beijing has not formally confirmed his participation, but expectations of his visit have grown.
If Xi does come to New Delhi, the outcome of Doval’s talks will matter. Progress on the border would make a Modi-Xi meeting easier to manage politically. Fresh friction could just as quickly overwhelm the wider agenda.
The diplomatic effort is unfolding against a difficult economic backdrop. The conflict in West Asia, disruption around the Strait of Hormuz and volatile energy markets are putting renewed pressure on Asian economies.
For India, the concern goes beyond crude prices. Energy disruption affects transportation, manufacturing, inflation and the import bill, while higher costs can also feed into food prices through diesel, fertilisers, farm operations, transportation and food processing.
China faces many of the same broad pressures, although its energy-sourcing pattern is different.
The two countries are therefore competing strategically while confronting some of the same economic risks. With Middle Eastern supplies constrained, India has increased its reliance on Russian crude. China has also expanded its presence in the Russian oil market, increasing competition for supplies that have traditionally been attractive to Indian refiners.
The economic relationship adds another complication.
New Delhi regards China as its principal long-term strategic competitor in Asia, yet Indian industry remains deeply embedded in Chinese supply chains. Indian manufacturers continue to rely on Chinese machinery, components, chemicals, pharmaceutical inputs, electronics and renewable-energy equipment.
India therefore faces a difficult balance: reducing strategic dependence on China while maintaining access to industrial supplies that remain important to the economy.
The answer from New Delhi is diversification rather than economic separation.
That broader reality gives Doval’s talks a relatively focused agenda. First is preventing another prolonged military crisis. Second is de-escalation and ensuring that incidents along the disputed frontier do not spiral into confrontation. Third is boundary management and delimitation.
The two sides have previously discussed an “early harvest” approach that could allow progress in less contentious areas while leaving the hardest territorial questions for later.
Reliable communication channels between commanders remain essential while troops continue to operate in close proximity along a disputed frontier. The immediate objective is to prevent another crisis; the larger one is to create enough stability for the broader relationship to become more predictable.
That wider normalisation could encompass trade, investment, technology, supply chains, energy security and people-to-people exchanges. But New Delhi’s position remains that such engagement cannot come at the expense of its security interests.
Doval’s Beijing visit therefore comes at a point when India and China are trying to stabilise what they can without pretending that the difficult issues have disappeared.
The border remains the immediate test. The harder question is whether that stability can support a wider reset while both countries navigate an increasingly uncertain geopolitical and economic environment.
