Politics
Surveillance by proxy: Nigerian Police use phone records to trap civ
THE Nigerian Police possess a vast surveillance infrastructure capable of mapping communication networks, allowing officers to track people through their call records and close contacts. In this report, The ICIR’s Nurudeen Akewushola investigates how the police use these capabilities to monitor, track, lure, and arrest civic actors and examines the surveillance infrastructure that powers such operations.
When Juwon Sanyaolu and other activists announced plans for a nationwide protest against hunger and economic hardship on June 12, 2024, he knew that security agencies would be watching. What he did not know was that they would also be watching the people close to him.
On June 6, the Lagos-based activist and the National Coordinator of the Take It Back Movement (TIB) led a press conference during which they announced plans for a nationwide protest on June 12, Democracy Day. Their grievances with the government were issues associated with hardship, hunger and an escalating level of poverty, which they accused the administration of President Bola Tinubu of worsening. Sanyaolu was arrested a day before the planned protest.
“Before my arrest, on the night of June 11, I was receiving strange calls which I had suspected were from security personnel,” he recalled.
On the eve of the planned protest, security operatives tracked him to a Shoprite outlet in Ikeja, Lagos, where he was arrested. But, according to Sanyaolu, they did not find him through conventional surveillance or intelligence gathering. Instead, they traced him through a friend he frequently spoke with on the phone.
The activist said officers first arrested his friend, identified in this report by the pseudonym Ayoola, before using that person to locate him.
“The way they tracked me was through the phone number I called most frequently,” Sanyaolu told The ICIR. “They later admitted this to me during interrogation.”
Ayoola knew where Sanyaolu was at the time. Under what Sanyaolu described as pressure from security operatives, information about his location was obtained, allowing officers to move in.
Several police vehicles subsequently arrived at the shopping complex, and Sanyaolu was picked up.
The activist said he was blindfolded and transported to the Lagos State Police Command. There, he said, officers accused him of attempting to overthrow the government because he was helping organise a protest.
During questioning, he said officers repeatedly referenced his communication history and call records. “They specifically said they had tracked the phone number I called most frequently and used it to locate me,” he said.
Ayoola was released immediately after brief detention, but Sanyaolu was detained for two days. Soon after Sanyaolu’s arrest, news of his detention quickly spread across social media and news platforms.
While in custody on June 12, the day of the protest, he said security agents blindfolded and handcuffed him before being informed that arrangements had been made to fly him out of Lagos.
“I was told that the aircraft had already arrived,” he said.
The transfer never happened. Sanyaolu was returned to his cell and released the following day. He later learned that media reports had already publicised the alleged plan to move him, which he believes may have disrupted it.
Nigeria Police’s multimillion-Naira surveillance system
Sanyaolu’s experience is one of a growing number of cases in which Nigerian security agencies have relied on phone records and communication patterns to locate and apprehend activists and civic actors. In these instances, rather than approaching targets directly, they first identify individuals within their close contact networks known as soft targets, detain them, and use them as leverage to track their primary target.
As a law enforcement agency, the Nigeria Police Force has legal authority to obtain certain telecommunications data during criminal investigations.
The Nigerian Communications Act requires telecommunications companies to assist law enforcement agencies in preventing and detecting crime and safeguarding national security. Similarly, the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act empowers authorised agencies to request subscriber information from service providers and, where required by law, intercept electronic communications for criminal investigations. These powers, however, are intended to be exercised lawfully and only for legitimate investigative purposes.
Beyond these legal powers, the federal government has spent billions of naira over the years building the police’s digital surveillance capabilities.
An analysis of budget records by The ICIR shows that between 2020 and 2025, the Nigeria Police received several multibillion-naira allocations to procure intelligence equipment, tracking technologies and upgrade a strategic surveillance platform codenamed COBWEB.
In 2020 alone, the force under the Ministry of Police Affairs budgeted ₦38 million for intelligence equipment, ₦257 million for the upgrade of intelligence tracking/monitoring systems, including the COBWEB OEM Licensing renewal and system.
The following year, it allocated ₦154 million for intelligence tracking and monitoring systems, including COBWEB Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) licence renewal and system maintenance, alongside another ₦125 million for intelligence equipment.
In 2022, the police budgeted ₦1.1 billion for intelligence equipment for the Technical Intelligence Unit (TIU), Intelligence Response Team (IRT) and Interpol.
Funding increased significantly in 2023. The police budgeted ₦7.5 billion as a Special Intervention Fund for the procurement of a Cyber Intelligence Tracking System (CITS), while another ₦4 billion was budgeted for the activation and upgrade of the COBWEB strategic surveillance platform. The system allocated an additional ₦2.9 billion in 2024 and another ₦2.9 billion in 2025 for further activation and upgrades under the Technical Intelligence Unit.
Procurement records reviewed by The ICIR show that these budgetary allocations translated into major contracts for surveillance infrastructure.
Information obtained from the Public Treasury Portal shows that in December 2021, the Nigeria Police paid ₦16.9 million (₦16,855,056) to Ontrac Technologies Limited for the procurement of a COBWEB Data Analytical Server. Two years later, in December 2023, the force paid an additional ₦2.62 billion to the same company as part payment for the “Emergency Activation and Upgrade of the Strategic Surveillance System of Public Safety for NPF Technical Intelligence Unit (COBWEB).”
Corporate records reviewed by The ICIR show that Ontrac Technologies Limited was incorporated in Nigeria on December 23, 2008, and is headquartered at 25 Colorado Close, Maitama, Abuja. Its status is active, and it is privately owned by Kenneth Emeka Nwabueze and Chukwudi Nwabueze, who serve as directors and shareholders, while Mfonobong Eno is listed as company secretary.
The ICIR visited the company’s registered address and confirmed that the property is a residential house. Security personnel stationed at the gate said they were unaware of any company operating from the premises and did not know the owner. When contacted, Mfonobong Eno, the company’s secretary, said he was not authorised to speak on behalf of the company.
Ontrac describes itself as an information and communications technology company that provides systems integration, cybersecurity, and telecommunications solutions to government and enterprise clients.
Trade records obtained by The ICIR further show that between May and July 2024, a surveillance technology company, Signum Intelligence Limited, shipped at least 63 consignments of surveillance-related equipment, including antenna modules, electronic modules and interlink cables, to Ontrac.
Signum Intelligence Limited is a United Kingdom-based surveillance technology company incorporated on 18 January 2017 and headquartered at Chester Business Park, Cheshire. The company was originally registered as Caenis Consulting Ltd before adopting its current name. Public records show that Signum develops and supplies communications intelligence and lawful interception technologies for government clients.
The company is currently led by Anna Louise Boecking, a British national who has served as director since June 2019. Before her appointment, the company was directed by Alexandra Boecking, a German national who was appointed at incorporation in January 2017 and remained in the role until her resignation in August 2019.
Signum’s publicly known product portfolio includes IMSI catchers, SS7 geolocation systems, Wi-Fi tracking platforms and active and passive interception technologies capable of identifying mobile subscribers, locating devices and collecting communications-related data. In 2022, investigative reports linked Signum to the Intellexa Group, a surveillance consortium, after it was identified as an intermediary in the sale of the Predator spyware to the government of Madagascar.
The timing of the shipments of the surveillance items delivered to Ontrac by Signum coincided with the time the former was implementing the multibillion-naira COBWEB upgrade for the Nigeria Police.
Although the Nigerian Police has never publicly disclosed the technical capabilities of the COBWEB platform, senior police officials have previously described its purpose.
During the inauguration of a Technical Intelligence Unit office in Kano in 2018, then Inspector-General of Police Ibrahim Idris said COBWEB was designed to strengthen the force’s technological capacity.
“The Technical Intelligence Unit, in line with international best practices, will link all state police commands with the Technical Intelligence COBWEB platform as soon as funds are made available,” he said.
The then Commissioner of Police in Kano also described COBWEB as a tracking system.
To better understand the significance of the equipment imported during the execution of the project, The ICIR spoke with OluGbenga Odeyemi, a cybersecurity expert and Chief Executive Officer of e86.
According to Odeyemi, antenna modules and interlink cables form the backbone of modern digital communication and intelligence infrastructure used by law enforcement agencies.
He explained that antenna modules transmit and receive radio-frequency signals for secure police communications, signal detection, geolocation and data transmission, while interlink cables connect antennae to routers, servers and processing units, ensuring that field data reaches intelligence centres securely and in real time.
“The imported equipment represents the physical backbone of the Nigeria Police Force’s ongoing transition from analogue legacy systems to digital, encrypted and highly secure communication networks,” he said.
According to him, the Technical Intelligence Unit can deploy such infrastructure to track kidnappers, locate hostages through signal direction-finding, secure police communications against interception, and connect surveillance assets—including remote cameras and mobile command units—to centralised intelligence databases for real-time crime analysis and mapping.
On June 29 and 30, The ICIR placed calls to the Force Public Relations Officer seeking clarification on the COBWEB platform, its capabilities, and whether it has been deployed in investigations involving journalists or activists.
On June 30 and July 1, a person who answered the spokesperson’s phone informed this reporter that he was unavailable and would respond upon his return. However, no response was received before publication.
The ICIR also sent text messages asking for details about the equipment and its usage on June 30 and July 2 but received no reply. In addition, messages were sent to his WhatsApp number on three occasions. Although the messages were delivered, they were not responded to before publication.
Four innocent contacts, one target
Daniel Akande, another activist based in Abuja, was arrested after the police traced him through four people he had contacted on the phone and used them to track him.
Akande, who played a leadership role during the August 2024 #EndBadGovernance protests, said he was arrested on September 1, 2024, while attending a church service in New Nyanya, Nasarawa State. According to him, a man in plain clothes approached him during the service, requested to speak with him outside, then produced handcuffs and identified himself as an officer of the Intelligence Response Team (IRT) before taking him into custody.
It was during interrogation at the IRT facility in Guzape, Abuja, that Akande learned the extent of the operation that preceded his arrest. Officers, he said, told him they had tracked his phone and detained at least four people whose only connection to him was that they had communicated with him shortly before his arrest.
One of them, he said, was a former colleague who had worked as his driver about four years earlier. The two had reconnected only days before the arrest after meeting by chance in Abuja, where they discussed Akande’s plan to sell his car.
According to Akande, the driver was arrested several days before him and questioned extensively about his whereabouts, despite not knowing where he lived.
Another person detained was a woman who had printed protest banners and leaflets for him in Nyanya. Akande said they had exchanged phone numbers after he transferred payment to her account. He believes investigators used those records to identify and question her about him.
His church shepherd was also drawn into the operation. Akande said the man received a call asking him to collect a parcel at a nearby junction, but was arrested immediately upon arrival. He believes officers identified him through their phone contacts.
A fourth person, a university student named Sadiq, was also arrested after calling Akande to thank him for helping secure his release in an unrelated case. According to Akande, the student was not involved in the protests but was nevertheless questioned because he had recently communicated with him.
“I met about four different people who had been arrested because of my case,” Akande said. “Some spent two or three days in detention. Others were held for four or five days before I was eventually arrested.”
Akande believes the arrests demonstrate how communication records can be used to map a person’s network of contacts rather than relying solely on direct surveillance. While he could not identify the specific technology used, he said the pattern convinced him that security operatives had access to his communication history.
“They doubled their energy when it came to activists,” he said. “The same technology they claim they don’t have to track terrorists suddenly became available when it was time to go after people protesting against the government’s bad economic policies. It’s a way to silence dissent and intimidate activists and journalists,” he said.
According to a report by the Institute for Development Studies, titled “Mapping the supply of surveillance technologies to Africa,” Nigeria is Africa’s largest customer for surveillance technologies, spending at least $2.7bn on surveillance technologies in the last decade.
Speaking with The ICIR, Gbenga Sesan, the Executive Director of the Paradigm Initiative, confirmed the organisation has observed an increasing reliance on telecom surveillance by Nigerian security agencies like the Nigeria Police to monitor, identify and arrest activists, journalists and other civic actors.
Paradigm Initiative is a non-profit organisation that works to connect underserved young Africans with digital opportunities and ensures the protection of their online rights.
Citing the organisation’s 2025 Londa report, which tracks digital rights across 29 African countries, Sesan pointed out that Nigeria dropped from fifth place in the 2024 rankings to a joint 10th position in 2025, reflecting a deterioration in digital rights protections as security agencies increasingly violated citizens’ rights under the guise of national security.
Sesan said that although government agencies have invested significantly in surveillance technologies, there is little transparency around how the systems are acquired and deployed.
“A lot of the investments are done without transparency, and while they are done in the name of security, they are abused for politically motivated surveillance,” he said.
Tracked through caretaker
Journalist Friday Alefia’s travail began when unknown callers began to call him repeatedly, trying to lure him into meetings and job offers. He suspected something was wrong, not known to him, that security operatives had already begun tracking his communications and would eventually use people within his contact network—what officers later described to him as “soft targets”—to locate and arrest him.
Alefia, publisher of Naija News Today, had published a series of reports alleging misconduct by a member of the House of Representatives representing Ezza South/Ikwo Federal Constituency in Ebonyi State.
The lawmaker denied wrongdoing, and the police later charged Alefia with five counts under the Cybercrimes Act over the publications. He was arrested in Lagos on September 23, 2025, transferred to Abuja, detained for about six weeks before being arraigned, and eventually spent a total of 86 days in detention before meeting his bail conditions.
According to him, the surveillance operation that led to his capture began in late August when he received a phone call from an unfamiliar number. When he returned the call, his caller identification application displayed the number as belonging to an Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP).
“I called one of my relatives who is a police officer,” Alefia recalled. “He told me to raise the alarm, but I didn’t want to make false accusations.”
The caller invited him to Lagos for a media-related job and insisted on meeting physically. Alefia declined, offering instead to handle any assignment remotely.
“He kept insisting we had to meet. That was when I became suspicious.”
Days later, Alefia travelled to Ebonyi State. Believing he might already be under surveillance, he said he deliberately changed hotels every night and avoided staying in one location.
His fears appeared justified.
On September 9, somebody invited him to the Ebonyi Township Stadium. Trusting the invitation, Alefia went. Shortly after arriving, another acquaintance urgently phoned him and told him to leave immediately.
The caller later explained that armed men and police officers had arrived at the stadium intending to arrest him.
“He told me the instruction was either to break my hand or my leg before handing me over to the police,” Alefia said.
He immediately fled Ebonyi, travelling first to Enugu before returning to Lagos.
But the phone calls continued.
Over the following weeks, Alefia said he received repeated calls from different numbers. One caller claimed to be recruiting staff for a boarding school. Another promised him employment in a federal ministry. At about 2:05 a.m. one morning, someone called to claim his sister had been involved in a road accident.
“I told him I don’t have a sister and ended the call,” he said.
Looking back, Alefia believes the calls were attempts to determine his location.
On the advice of his police officer relative, he removed his SIM cards and relied mainly on Wi-Fi. “I was told they might already have broken into my location.”
According to Alefia, his precaution came too late. While in detention, he said officers explained how they eventually located him. Rather than tracking him directly, they identified people with whom he communicated frequently.
“They called them soft targets,” Alefia said.
The first people identified, according to him, included his pastor, the caretaker of the compound where he lived in Ikorodu, and a local disc jockey.
He said officers told him they initially considered arresting his pastor but abandoned the idea because they feared news of the arrest might spread through the church’s WhatsApp group and alert him.
Instead, they arrested the caretaker.
“They threatened him and told him he wouldn’t be released unless he took them to where I was,” Alefia said.
The caretaker eventually led six police officers to Alefia’s Lagos apartment.
“When I looked through the window, I saw my caretaker standing with another man,” he recalled. “As soon as I opened the door, the man grabbed me.”
Alefia said the officers identified themselves as members of the police, handcuffed him, searched his apartment, confiscated his laptop, phones, passport and personal belongings before taking him first to a nearby police station in Ikorodu and later to the Lagos State Police Command in Ikeja.
That night, police presented him with a petition and demanded that he write a statement, but he refused and insisted until his lawyer arrived.
The following day, he was driven by road to Abuja and detained at the Intelligence Response Team’s detention facility in Guzape, where he remained for six weeks before being charged in court.
Court records show he was later arraigned on cybercrime charges over publications concerning the Ebonyi lawmaker. Alefia said conversations with investigators while in detention gave him insight into what they described as the “soft target” approach.
“If they are looking for you and cannot get you directly, they begin tracing people you communicate with frequently,” he said. “If they find someone close to your location, they arrest that person and use them to get to you.”
Amidst the struggle, Alefia lost an admission offer to study digital marketing at the University of Chester, England, spent nearly three months in detention, suffered health complications, and had his movement severely restricted.
“As a journalist, it makes you realise that your digital footprint can be used against you,” he said. “Once someone decides to come after you, they can trace your communications and build a path to you through the people around you.”
Arrest through “soft targets” unlawful
The arrest of activists such as Juwon Sanyaolu, Daniel Akande and journalist Friday Alefia James through their close contacts raises serious constitutional questions, as Nigerian law prohibits the arrest or detention of one person in place of another.
Under Section 35 of the 1999 Constitution, every person has the right to personal liberty and may only be deprived of that liberty in accordance with procedures established by law. Similarly, Section 36 guarantees the right to a fair hearing and reinforces the principle that criminal liability is personal.
Ridwan Oke, a human rights lawyer who defended EndSARS protesters, said the same constitutional principle applies where security agencies use telecommunications surveillance to identify and detain a suspect’s friends, family members or associates solely to obtain information about the suspect’s whereabouts.
“Security operatives are prohibited from arresting one person in lieu of another. Section 7 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act specifically states that a person shall not be arrested in lieu of a suspect,” he said.
According to Oke, law enforcement agencies cannot lawfully arrest a friend, relative or any other innocent person to pressure a suspect into surrendering or to use them as leverage during an investigation.
He added that surveillance itself is subject to legal safeguards.
“Before you track citizens, you need a court order. If you need to track their phones, you need a warrant and the order of the court. It has to be justified by law,” he said.
Oke noted that although journalists are not exempt from lawful investigations, any surveillance that interferes with their constitutional right to privacy must be authorised by a court and based on a legitimate criminal investigation.
“The law is very clear. You cannot access somebody’s phone without a court order. You have to justify to the court why you need such access,” he said.
Olumide Babalola, pioneer chairman of the Nigerian Bar Association Data Protection Committee, similarly said security agencies can lawfully deploy surveillance technologies, but only under strict legal conditions.
According to him, Section 39 of the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act permits certain forms of access to communications, while the NCC Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations 2019 provides a framework for interception in specific circumstances.
He, however, emphasised that such actions must be backed by a legitimate purpose, reasonable suspicion, procedural compliance and respect for data protection principles.
“Yes, the law allows security agencies to use surveillance technologies, but this power is not absolute and is strictly circumscribed by constitutional provisions and statutory regulations,” Babalola said. “A court warrant must first be sought and obtained.”
On the use of communication records to identify and detain people connected to activists and journalists, Babalola was unequivocal when he said it is a gross violation of the law and fundamental rights.
“Using call data as a bait to locate and arrest a third party by detaining their innocent contacts represents a serious abuse of police power,” Babalola said. “The practice violates the rights of the detained individuals and exceeds the lawful authority of the police.”
Curbing illegal surveillance of civic actors
The United Nations has described the widespread use of spyware on journalists and activists as extremely alarming.
“Use of surveillance software has been linked to arrest, intimidation and even killings of journalists and human rights defenders. Reports of surveillance also have the invidious effect of making people censor themselves through fear. Journalists and human rights defenders play an indispensable role in our societies, and when they are silenced, we all suffer,” noted Michelle Bachelet, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
There have been previous efforts by civil organisations to curb illegal surveillance. Sesan noted that Paradigm Initiative challenged the Nigerian government in court as far back as 2013 over increased surveillance without adequate safeguards for citizens, adding that “not much has changed” since then.
The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has urged governments and surveillance technology companies to take stronger measures to curb the misuse of spyware and other surveillance tools against journalists and human rights defenders.
In its policy brief, the organisation noted that while some governments and intergovernmental bodies have taken steps to regulate the surveillance industry, existing safeguards remain inadequate.
It cited efforts by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, who in 2019 proposed a legal and policy framework to improve transparency, accountability and regulation of the private surveillance industry. CPJ also referenced guidance issued by the U.S. State Department in 2020 for companies operating in the sector, although it noted that the guidance is not legally binding.
According to CPJ, the European Union has also adopted export control regulations for surveillance technologies aimed at increasing transparency. However, the organisation argued that the measures do not go far enough to prevent governments with poor press freedom records from acquiring sophisticated surveillance capabilities.
To address the problem, CPJ called on governments to enact and enforce laws prohibiting the use of spyware to target journalists and media organisations. It also urged authorities to ban the export or transfer of surveillance technologies—including through third parties—to governments with records of press freedom violations.
The organisation further recommended prohibiting state agencies from purchasing or licensing surveillance technologies from companies that sell such products to governments with poor human rights and press freedom records, or that fail to establish effective safeguards to prevent clients from targeting journalists.
It urged companies in the surveillance industry to align their operations with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and subject their activities to independent oversight.
Gbenga Sesan added that surveillance powers should be subjected to stronger judicial oversight.
According to him, requirements for obtaining court warrants are frequently ignored or circumvented, undermining citizens’ privacy rights.
“We would like to see more respect for judicial oversight,” he said. “The requirement for warrants has been mostly neglected or corruptly side-stepped, and this has to change.”
Nurudeen Akewushola is an investigative reporter and fact-checker with The ICIR. He believes courageous in-depth investigative reporting is the key to social justice, accountability and good governance in society. You can reach him via nyahaya@icirnigeria.org and @NurudeenAkewus1 on Twitter.
