Foreign News
Why Tarique Rahman Should Visit India
Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman should visit India.
That may sound counter-intuitive when Dhaka is demanding former prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s extradition and relations with New Delhi remain strained. But the political argument for a visit is stronger precisely because of those tensions.
Accepting India’s invitation would allow Rahman would put Hasina, the Ganga water-sharing treaty, electricity and energy supplies, trade and connectivity on the same negotiating table.
More importantly, by going to Delhi despite pressure from Bangladesh’s anti-India camp, he would demonstrate that he is confident enough to engage India without being beholden to it. That would strengthen his hand both at home and across the negotiating table.
The alternative is to make the Hasina issue a veto over the entire relationship. That would give India little incentive to address Bangladesh’s other concerns and leave Rahman with fewer, not more, levers of influence.
Bangladesh insists it has a legitimate demand for Hasina’s extradition. India has acknowledged receiving the request and says it is examining it through its legal processes.
Rahman should raise the issue directly and forcefully. But he should not make a resolution of it a precondition for talking to India about everything else.
A strong prime minister should be able to do both.
Indeed, visiting India could help Rahman demonstrate precisely the political strength that his critics may question. There is already pressure within Bangladesh to make the visit conditional on movement over Hasina. Rahman could instead say: I will go to Delhi, I will raise the extradition demand, and I will negotiate every other issue in Bangladesh’s interest.
That is a much harder nationalist position to attack.
It also deprives the anti-India lobby of an easy argument. If Rahman refuses to visit, his opponents can claim that he is being forced to stay away by India’s handling of Hasina. If he goes, he can demonstrate that engagement with India is not submission. In fact, he can turn the visit into proof of his independence.
The practical stakes are substantial.
Bangladesh needs energy. Its dependence on imported electricity makes India an important supplier, while Dhaka’s continuing gas and power shortages make reliable energy supplies an immediate economic concern. India, meanwhile, has an interest in expanding cross-border electricity trade and maintaining a stable neighbour.
Rahman should use it as a negotiation, not a favour. He can seek more reliable electricity supplies, better commercial terms and deeper integration with India’s regional power market. He can also link energy cooperation to wider economic and connectivity arrangements.
The Ganga issue is even more time-sensitive.
The 1996 Ganga Water Sharing Treaty expires in December 2026. Bangladesh wants a successor agreement, while India has its own concerns over water availability and allocation. Technical officials from the two countries have already been conducting joint work at Farakka, but the larger political negotiation remains to be settled. This is not an issue Rahman can afford to conduct from the sidelines.
The existing treaty was negotiated for a different hydrological and demographic reality. A new agreement will have to address Bangladesh’s demand for dependable dry-season flows while taking account of India’s own requirements and the changing behaviour of the river system.
Rahman’s strongest position is therefore not to approach Delhi as a government demanding concessions. It is to approach it as a government with something India also needs: a stable, functioning and cooperative relationship with Bangladesh.
That relationship has value. India needs connectivity with its northeastern states. It has an interest in regional energy trade. It needs cooperation on border management, waterways and commerce.
Bangladesh also has alternatives, including deeper economic and political engagement with other powers. Rahman does not need to threaten India with those alternatives. The existence of alternatives is leverage enough.
That is why the politics of the visit matter almost as much as the substance.
The Hasina era left India deeply associated in Bangladesh with the Awami League government. Her flight to India after her ouster has made that association even more politically toxic. But Rahman cannot build a new relationship with India simply by repudiating the old one. He has to replace it with something different.
The BNP government should seek a relationship in which Bangladesh is neither an Indian client nor an Indian adversary. That requires dealing with India as a neighbour whose interests sometimes coincide with Bangladesh’s and sometimes do not. A visit by Rahman would make that distinction visible. He would also be negotiating from a stronger domestic position than if he stayed away.
If he can face the anti-India lobby, travel to Delhi, put Hasina on the table, demand a better water arrangement and negotiate energy and trade agreements, he returns home with a powerful political message: I did not go to India to seek approval. I went because Bangladesh had business to conduct.
And if he gets results, the political dividend is greater still.
Hasina should remain on the agenda. But she should not become the entire agenda.
There is a difference between being tough with India and being strong enough to deal with India. The first can be performed from a podium in Dhaka. The second requires sitting across the table in Delhi and negotiating.
If Tarique Rahman wants to establish himself as a statesman rather than simply the leader who replaced Sheikh Hasina, this is his opportunity. He should go to India not despite the tensions, but because of them.
The strongest message he could send to both Delhi and Dhaka is that Bangladesh is confident enough to engage India on its own terms.
